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ABSTRACT 
In the world of electronic commerce individuals unwittingly impart their information to 
possible predators of personal information.  For example, cookies are used to “tag” users 
accessing a specific web site.  When the user accesses the same site again, a copy of the 
cookie alerts the remote server, who then knows whom the user is and that s/he visited 
the site before.  Obtaining and dealing in data about web users have become everyday 
occurrences – in some instances such “data mining” forms the main focus of several 
businesses.   
It is common cause that the Internet may be and indeed is used quite frequently in 
manners that infringe various rights contained in our Bill of Rights.  In many cases, what 
happens on the Internet may also attract criminal liability.  As a result it often happens that 
two fundamental rights, namely the right to freedom of expression and the right to privacy, 
come into potential conflict. 
In a democracy, freedom of expression is almost taken for granted.  The press and 
other media, especially, rely heavily on this right.  In South Africa, section 16(1) of the 
Constitution guarantees the right to freedom of expression, which includes, among others, 
freedom of the press and other media; freedom to receive or impart information or ideas; 
freedom of artistic creativity; academic freedom and freedom of scientific research.  As 
such, it may be that spammers have the constitutional right to commercial expression.  
The question is: Do spammers have the right to express themselves in private property?  It 
is suggested that they be only allowed to do so after having obtained the consent of the 
individual to be included in a mailing list that would be used to send unsolicited e-mail 
advertising.  Section 45 of the Electronic Communications Transactions Act of 2002 
(ECTA) now prohibits the sending of unsolicited goods, services or communications.   
The right to privacy is protected by section 14 of the South African Constitution.  In 
contrast thereto, section 32 of the Constitution guarantees the right to access to 
information.  Neither of these rights are absolute rights, as they may be limited in 
accordance with section 36 of the Constitution.   
The ECTA prescribes that suppliers of goods on the Internet need to, amongst 
others, make its privacy statement available to users of its site.  The ensuring of the right 
to privacy is not, however, a compulsory provision of ECTA.  Section 50 of the ECTA 
provides for the voluntary compliance of the principles pertaining to the collection of 
personal information as set out in section 51 of the Act. 
Against this background, this paper addresses the South African legal background to 
privacy on the Internet. 
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THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONSITUTION AND ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
When considering several of the methods employed in electronic commerce conducted via 
the Internet, e.g. the use of spam1 and cookies2, two potentially conflicting fundamental 
rights contained in the Bill of Rights of the South African Constitution3 come into play, 
namely, the right to freedom of expression, and the right to privacy.  
Spamming has been defined as “the bulk sending of unsolicited e-mail advertisements to 
huge numbers of Internet users”4.  It may be argued that spammers have the constitutional 
right to commercial expression5.  The question is: Do spammers have the right to express 
themselves in private property?  The same question may be posed regarding the use of 
cookies, data mining, etc. 
In certain instances the fundamental rights contained in the Bill of Rights may be limited in 
accordance with the so-called “limitations clause” - section 36 of the Constitution.  In what 
follows, the limitations clause will firstly be examined, after which the rights to privacy and 
freedom of expression, and in particular the circumstances relating to their limitation, will 
be analysed.  In the second part of this paper, the provisions of the ECTA as being a “law 
of general application” in terms of Section 36 will be discussed in detail.  
 
2. SECTION 36 – THE LIMITATIONS CLAUSE 
Section 36 of the Constitution, the so-called “limitations clause”, specifically allows a 
limitation of a fundamental right in certain circumstances.  The section states that the 
rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of a law of general application, and 
then only to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom6.  In order to determine 
whether this is so, one should further take into account all relevant factors, including the 
nature of the right; the importance of the purpose of the limitation; the nature and extent of 
the limitation; the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and less restrictive 
means to achieve the purpose7. 
 
3. SECTION 36 THROUGH THE CASES 
In considering the constitutionality of the death penalty, the Constitutional Court in S v 
Makwanyane8 formulated certain guidelines concerning the application of the general 
limitations clause9 in the interim Constitution10.  It was pointed out that the limitation of 
constitutional rights for a purpose that is reasonable and necessary in a democratic 
society is ultimately an assessment based on proportionality.  This in turn calls for the 
weighing up of the purposes, effects and importance of the infringing legislation against 
the nature and effect of the infringement caused by the legislation.  The more severe the 






 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 (“the Constitution”). 
4
 Buys (Ed).  2000. Cyberlaw @ SA:  The Law of the Internet in South Africa 381. 
5
 Section 16(1) of the Constitution.  The issue regarding the substantive content of any spam will not be addressed here. 
6
 Section 36(1). 
7
 Section 36(1)(a)-(e). 
8
 1995 3 SA 391 (CC). 
9
 S v Makwanyane (op.cit.) para 104 
10
 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993 herein referred to as “the Interim Constitution”. 
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limitation/s of a fundamental right, the more compelling the reasons for its justification 
should be11.  
In Makwanyane the court weighed up the rights to life, to human dignity and to 
freedom from inhuman or degrading punishment against the purposes of the death 
penalty, viz. as a deterrent to violent crime and its recurrence and as a fitting retribution for 
such crimes12.  The court found that, given the drastic effects of the death penalty, a far 
less restrictive means of achieving the same purpose, namely life imprisonment, should be 
preferred13. 
The balancing approach formulated in Makwanyane was subsequently applied in 
several cases.  In National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v Minister 
of Justice and Others14 the Constitutional Court was asked to adjudicate upon the 
constitutionality of various statutory prohibitions concerning sodomy15.  After finding that 
the criminalisation of sodomy infringed the right to privacy in section 14 of the 
Constitution16, the Court enquired whether such infringement of the right to privacy could 
be justified in terms of s 36 of the Constitution.  It was held that such limitation was 
unjustifiable as it was a severe limitation of the right17, the limitation itself served no valid 
purpose18, and furthermore, an analysis of the jurisprudence of other open and democratic 
societies based on human dignity, equality and freedom on balance supported the 
conclusion that the criminalisation of sodomy was unjustifiable19. 
In S v Manamela the reverse onus provision of the General Law Amendment Act20 
was weighed up against the right of arrested, detained and accused persons to remain 
silent21.  It was held that the effective prosecution of crime was a societal objective of great 
significance which could, where appropriate, justify the infringement of fundamental 
rights22, and that it outweighed the right to silence in this instance23. 
Ultimately therefore, the purpose of any given law will be weighed up against the 
importance of the fundamental right that it stands to infringe. 
 
4. RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
 
                                                 
11
 See S v Bhulwana 1996 1 SA 388 (CC) para 18.  See also S v Manamela and Another (Director-General of Justice 
intervening) 2000 3 SA 1 (CC) para 32. 
12
 S v Makwanyane (op.cit.) para 117 and para 185. 
13
 S v Makwanyane (op.cit.) para 128.  See also para 184 in which Didcott J questions the deterrent effect of the death 
penalty. 
14
 1999 1 SA 6 (CC). 
15
 Viz. section 20A of the Sexual Offences Act 23 of 1957; the inclusion of sodomy as an item in Schedule 1 to the 
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 and the inclusion of sodomy as an item in the Schedule to the Security Officers Act 
92 of 1987. 
16
 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality (op.cit.) para 32. 
17
 Ibid para 36. 
18
 Ibid para 37. 
19
 Ibid para 39 read with para 57. 
20
 Act 62 of 1955, section 5.  This section provided for an accused to prove that she or he had reasonable cause for 
believing that goods acquired or received were the property of the person from whom they were received or that such 
person had the authority of the owner to dispose of them. 
21
 S 35(1)(a) of the Constitution. 
22
 S v Manamela (op.cit.) para 27. 
23
 Ibid para 38 where it was held that “there was nothing unreasonable, oppressive or unduly intrusive in asking an 
accused who had already been shown to be in possession of stolen goods, acquired otherwise than at a public sale, to 
produce the requisite evidence, namely that she or he had reasonable cause for believing that the goods were acquired 
from the owner or from some other person who had the authority of the owner to dispose of them.” 
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4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Section 14 of the Constitution states that everyone has the right to privacy, which 
shall include the right not to have their person or home searched; their property searched; 
their possessions seized; or the privacy of their communications infringed24.  It is said that 
section 14 protects information to the extent that it limits the ability to gain, publish, 
disclose or use information about others25.   
 
4.2 RIGHT TO PRIVACY THROUGH THE CASES 
That a high premium was to be placed on the right to privacy in the new South Africa 
became clear soon after the Interim Constitution was adopted.  Ackerman J analysed and 
discussed the concept of personal privacy in the Constitutional Court case of Bernstein v 
Bester26, and stated that a very high level of protection should be given to the individual’s 
intimate personal sphere of life and the maintenance of its basic preconditions, and that 
there was a final untouchable sphere of human freedom that was beyond any interference 
from any public authority.  
In a subsequent case27, Langa DP elaborated on the above by clearly stating that the 
right to privacy does not relate solely to the individual within his or her intimate sphere: 
“[W] hen people are in their offices, in their cars or on mobile telephones, they 
still retain a right to be left alone by the State unless certain conditions are 
satisfied.  Wherever a person has the ability to decide what he or she wishes 
to disclose to the public and the expectation that such a decision will be 
respected is reasonable, the right to privacy will come into play.” 
In Case v Minister of Safety and Security28 the accused successfully challenged the 
constitutionality of statutory charges relating to the possession of pornography29.  The 
Constitutional Court held that any ban imposed on the possession of erotic material kept 
within the privacy of one’s home invaded the personal privacy guaranteed by the (interim) 
Constitution30. 
It is important to note, however, that like most other fundamental rights, the right to 
privacy is not absolute.  While stressing the importance of the right to privacy, the 
Constitutional Court in the Case matter also stated that “the protection accorded to the 
right of privacy is broad but it can also be limited in appropriate circumstances”31, and that 
the scope of a person’s privacy should extend only to those areas where he/she would 
have a legitimate expectation of privacy32. 
                                                 
24
 Section 14(d). 
25
 McQuoid-Mason.  1998. Constitutional Law of South Africa “Privacy”  18. 
26
 Bernstein op.cit. 
27
 Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences and Others v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd and Others: In 
Re Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd and Others v Smit NO and Others 2001 1 SA 545 (CC). 
28
 Case and Another v Minister of Safety and Security and Others 1996 3 SA 617 (CC); Curtis v Minister of Safety and 
Security and Others 1996 3 SA 617 (CC). 
29
 Viz. the prohibition on the possession of indecent or obscene photographic matter in terms of s 2(1) of the Indecent or 
Obscene Photographic Matter Act 37 of 1967.  In para 91 of Case (op.cit.)  Didcott J held “What erotic material I may 
choose to keep within the privacy of my home, and only for my personal use there, is nobody’s business but mine.  It 
certainly is not the business of society or the State.  Any ban imposed on my possession of such material for that solitary 
purpose invades the personal privacy which section 13 of the Interim Constitution…guarantees that I shall enjoy.” 
30
 Case (Op. cit) para 91. 
31
 Madala J in Case op.cit.  para 106. 
32
 Bernstein op. cit para 75. 
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It has been pointed out that a “legitimate expectation of privacy” will be that which 
society recognises as an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy33.  This in turn 
means that a person cannot complain about an invasion of privacy if he/she has 
consented to having his/her privacy invaded, which consent may be express or implied.   
In the Bernstein case supra, Ackerman J in his analysis of the continuum on which 
the legitimacy of an expectation of having one’s privacy respected may fall, noted that “[t] 
his inviolable core is left behind once an individual enters into relationships with persons 
outside this closest intimate sphere; the individual’s activities then acquire a social 
dimension and the right of privacy in this context becomes subject to limitation.”34 
 
5.  THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
In a democracy, freedom of expression is almost taken for granted.  The press and other 
media, especially, rely heavily on this right.  Section 16 of the Constitution provides that 
everyone has the right to freedom of expression, which includes freedom of the press and 
other media35 and freedom to receive or impart information or ideas36. 
As is the case with almost all the rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights, the right to 
freedom of expression is not absolute.  Section 36 of the Constitution37 sets out the 
circumstances under which a fundamental right may be limited.  In addition, section 16 
contains its own restrictions38, which provide that the right to freedom of expression does 
not protect the following:  Propaganda for war; incitement for imminent violence; or 
advocacy of hatred that is based on race, ethnicity, gender or religion, and that constitutes 
incitement to cause harm.  (These relate to the content of an expression, and are therefore 
beyond the scope of this paper.)  Suffice it to say that these forms of expression can be 
limited even without adhering to Section 3639. 
 
5.2 CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION FOR SPAMMING? 
It is common cause that spam can be regarded as a subspecies of advertising, and as 
such, should be regarded as commercial expression40, which, in turn, attracts the 
protection afforded by Section 16(1)(b) of the Constitution.  The next logical question 
relates to how far this protection would extend.  Would spammers, for example, have the 
right to express themselves on private property without the consent of the owner?   
To date, no court case dealing directly with this issue has been decided in South 
Africa.  However, it is submitted that two recent decisions by our High Courts relating to 
the Constitutional protection of the (unauthorised) erection of billboards may be very 
illuminating, as both examined the question about the extent of protection accorded to 
commercial expression. 
                                                 
33
 De Waal et al.  1998. The Bill of Rights Handbook  212. 
34
 Bernstein (op.cit.) para 77. 
35
 Section 16 (1)(a). 
36
 Section 16(1)(b).  The right to freedom of expression also contains the right to freedom of artistic creativity (Section 
16(1)(c)) and to academic freedom and freedom of scientific research (Section 16(1)(d)). 
37
 See paragraphs 2 and 3 above. 
38
 Section 16(2). 
39
 Rautenbach & Malherbe. 1996. Constitutional Law Johannesburg: Butterworths. 
40
 De Waal at 243 defines commercial expression as “…expression proposing a commercial transaction.  The most 
obvious example is advertising.” 
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In North Central Local Council and South Central Local Council v Roundabout 
Outdoor (Pty) Ltd and Others41, Kondile J made it clear that advertising is a form of 
commercial speech, and furthermore, that commercial speech itself is an entrenched right 
in terms of the Constitution42.  However, it was further stated that there are elements of a 
right that constitute its core values and others that are at the periphery of protection (and 
are therefore accorded lesser protection.)  Most commercial speech, the court found, is 
regarded as of peripheral value43.   
The learned Judge then proceeded to a Section 36 analysis of the facts in which the 
aim of the infringing legislation (namely to achieve the objective of traffic safety and to 
improve and preserve the appearance of the city) was weighed against the right to freely 
erect billboards as protected by the right to freedom of expression.  It was found that the 
limitation of the right was indeed reasonable and justified. 
In contrast to the above ruling, the Cape Provincial Division in City of Cape Town v 
Ad Outpost (Pty) Ltd and Others44 found that a similar municipal by-law absolutely 
prohibiting the erection of billboards within certain areas was unconstitutional.  Davis J 
furthermore cautioned against the “…tendency to conclude uncritically that commercial 
expression bears less constitutional recognition than political or artistic speech…45”   
In the Section 36 analysis the Court stated that the desired result of the by-law could 
have been achieved by means less damaging to the right in question – even if commercial 
expression is to be considered to carry less weight than other forms of expression46.   
The difference in conclusions reached by these two High Courts may be explained by  
the fact that the relevant by-law in Ad Outpost constituted a complete prohibition of 
commercial speech (in the form of outdoor advertising), while the by-law in Roundabout 
offered at least the possibility of permission being granted for the erection of an outdoor 
advertisement47.  Nevertheless, the issue as to the status of commercial expression  (and 
by implication, of spamming) remains unclear. 
    Against this background the provisions of the ECTA may now be examined. 
                                                 
41
 2002(2) SA 625 (D & CLD). 
42
 Ibid at 633 D. 
43
 Ibid at 634 C – E; 635 A - B. 
44
 2000 (2) SA 733. 
45
 Ibid at 749 D. 
46
 Ibid at 750 J – 751 A. 
47
 North Central Local Council and South Central Local Council v Roundabout Outdoor (Pty) Ltd and Others (op. cit) at 
635 D – E. 
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6. ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS AND TRANSACTIONS ACT 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The Electronic Communications and Transactions Act48 was assented to on 31 July 2002 
and it entered into force on 30 August 200249.  The ECTA repealed and replaces the 
Computer Evidence Act50.   
Some of the objects of the ECTA are to51: 
(a) Remove and prevent barriers to electronic communications and transactions in 
South Africa; 
(b) Promote legal certainty and confidence in respect of electronic communications and 
transactions; 
(c) Ensure that electronic transactions in South Africa conform to the highest 
international standards; and 
(d) Develop a safe, secure and effective environment for the consumer, business and 
Government to conduct and use electronic transactions. 
This section of the paper focuses on the salient provisions of the ECTA as provided for in 
Chapters VII52 and VIII53 thereof. 
 
6.2 GENERAL PROVISIONS 
It is important to note that the ECTA must be interpreted in such a manner as not to 
exclude any statutory provisions nor the common law54. 
 
6.3 CONSUMER PROTECTION 
 
6.3.1 INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
Part VII of the ECTA provides for the protection of consumers55 that enter into electronic 
transactions.  This part also deals with the receipt of unsolicited goods, services or 
communications. 
It is interesting to note that the legislature confers the rights of protection as set out in 
this Part VII of the ECTA to all agreements entered into, irrespective of the legal system 
applicable to an agreement56.  This provision ensures that a supplier cannot state that the 
agreement concluded electronically is governed by, for example, a legal system that 
places lesser obligations on the supplier.  In addition hereto, section 49 provides that any 
provision that excludes the rights provided to consumers will be null and void. 
 
                                                 
48
 Act No. 25 of 2002 (hereinafter “ECTA”). 
49
 Proc R66 in Government Gazette 23809 of 30 August 2002. 
50
 Act No. 57 of 1983. 
51
 Section 2. 
52
 Consumer Protection. 
53
 Protection of Personal Information. 
54
 Section 3. 
55
 Defined in section 1 as “any natural person who enters or intends entering into an electronic transaction with a supplier 
as the end user of the goods or services offered by that supplier”. 
56
 Section 47. 
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6.3.2 CONCLUDING TRANSACTIONS ON THE WEB 
Any supplier that wants to offer goods or services for sale, for hire or exchange on the 
Internet must provide certain information to consumers in the goods or services so offered.  
The following, amongst others, are required to be provided57: 
(a) the full name and legal status of the supplier58; 
(b) full contact details59; 
(c) full description of the goods or services; 
(d) full price of the goods (inclusive of transport costs, taxes, etc)60; 
(e) terms of the agreement (including guarantees, the refund or exchange policy); 
(f) security procedures and privacy policy of the supplier in respect of payment, 
payment information and personal information of the consumer; and 
(g) reference to the cooling off period. 
Section 44 provides an automatic right to cool off to consumers.  In the event of an 
agreement to supply goods, the consumer may cancel the agreement within seven (7) 
days of receipt of such goods or in terms of an agreement to supply services; same may 
be cancelled within seven (7) days of having concluded the agreement.  It should also be 
noted that this right to cool off also relates to all related credit agreements for the supply of 
the goods or services61.  The only costs that may be recovered from the consumer are the 
direct costs related to returning the goods. 
On the other hand, section 43(3) provides that a consumer may cancel an agreement 
within 14 days after having received the goods or services in the event that the supplier 
does not provide the required information or not allowing a consumer to review the 
electronic transaction, correct mistakes and to allow the consumer to withdraw from the 
transaction before it being completed. 
There is also an obligation on suppliers to ensure a safe payment system being in 
place.  Failing to provide this, could result in any damages suffered by the consumer being 
claimed back from the supplier62. 
It should, however, be borne in mind that the right to cool off does not relate to the 
following transactions63: 
(a) financial services; 
(b) auctions; 
(c) supply of foodstuffs intended for everyday use at home; 
(d) where the price for the supply of the goods are services are dependent on price 
fluctuations beyond the suppliers’ control; 
(e) goods that were made for the consumer, where the nature of the goods dictate that 
they cannot be returned or in the case of goods that are likely to deteriorate or 
expire rapidly; 
(f) where audio or video recordings or computer software were unsealed by the 
consumer; 
(g) gambling or lottery services; 
(h) sale of newspapers, periodicals, magazines and books; and 
                                                 
57
 Section 43(1). 
58
 In the case of a juristic person, the registration number, names of office bearers and place of registration (s 43(1)(f)). 
59
 Physical address, telephone number, website address, e-mail address, domicilium citandi et executandi (ss43(1)(b); 
(c) & (g). 
60
 Section 43(1)(i). 
61
 Section 44(2). 
62
 Section 43(5) & (6). 
63
 Section 42(2). 
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(i) the provision of accommodation, transport, catering or leisure services and where 
the supplier undertakes to provide these services on a specific date or within 
specific period when the agreement is concluded. 
 
6.4 UNSOLICITED GOODS, SERVICES AND COMMUNICATIONS 
 
6.4.1 SPAMMING DEFINED  
Spam may be defined as any form of unsolicited e-mail that is received.  In its purist form, 
this definition could thus also include e-mails that are received from, for example family 
and friends, without having solicited the e-mail from the sender.  However, such receipt of 
unsolicited e-mails is not the problem that is encountered by unsuspecting Internet users.  
Generaly, spamming refers to include amongst others64: 
 Chain letters 
 Pyramid schemes (including Multilevel Marketing) 
 Other “Get Rich Quick” or “make Money fast” schemes 
 Offers of phone sex and advertisements for pornographic web sites 
 Offers of software for collecting e-mail addresses and sending unsolicited commercial 
e-mail (“UCE”)65 
 Offers of bulk e-mailing services for sending UCE 
 Stock offerings for unknown start-up corporations 
 Quack health products and remedies 
 Illegally pirated software (“warez”) 
 Mail bombs (i.e. flooding of mail box or mail system)  
Windows-based pop ups are also now used by spammers.  These are very annoying 
when they pop up whilst working66.   
 
6.4.2 WHAT ARE THE PROBLEMS WITH SPAMMING? 
Spamming is very costly.  However, the spammer does not carry the costs as these are 
ultimately borne by the end-user.  These costs not only relate to the costs carried for 
access to the ISP, but a lot of time is wasted by having to wage through all unsolicited 
mail.  In addition thereto, the network becomes slower67, which also has a cost 
implication68.  Moreover, bandwidth is also wasted by junk mail which may, in turn, lead to 
an increase in the costs to the end-user. 
In order to circumvent filters, used by ISPs, spammers often resort to fraud, i.e. by 
stating something other than advertisement in the subject line.  In addition thereto, the e-
mail headers are often forged.  In other cases spammers use an innocent third party’s e-
mail address to send their mail from, with a result that both the receiving and innocent 
relaying systems are flooded by unwanted e-mails. 
                                                 
64
 http://www.cause.org/about/problem.shtml; http://internetprivacyfordummies.com/modules.php?op=modload&name;   
65
 Unsolicited commercial e-mail, which is the biggest spamming problem (http://www.peterman.co.za/spam.html). 
66
 These pop up windows must be distinguished from pop up windows on web sites.  These are adverts, paid for by the 
vendor, which helps to sponsor the site that is being visited. 
67
 http://www.cause.org/about/problem.shtml.  For an Internet Service Provider (“ISP”) time not only includes the 
processing time in their mail servers, but it also includes time spent on their CPUs, which slows down the other mail in 
their queues. 
68
 It has been estimated that if all 400 million Internet users were to spend only one hour per month to clear their e-mail 
boxes from junk mail, it will take to 4.8 billion hours (or 2.5 million working years per annum) – 
http://www.peterman.co.za/spam.html 
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Spamming also has a huge annoyance factor.  One may be waiting for urgent mail to 
come through and instead vast quantities of unsolicited e-mails arrive in your mail box.  It 
takes time to sort through the wanted and the unwanted e-mails.  Spamming slows down 
your system, which leads to further frustration. 
More importantly, one’s constitutional right to privacy is infringed upon.  A person 
pays for her/his e-mail address and same ought not to be in the public domain.  The 
situation therefore presents itself where one person’s (the e-mail user’s) right to privacy 
must be weighed against another’s (the spammer’s ) right to freedom of expression.  From 
the aforegoing discussion of these fundamental rights69, it is submitted that, should such a 
question ever be judicially scrutinized, precedence suggests that the right to privacy would 
be accorded the higher importance70. 
 
6.4.3 ETHICS OF SPAMMING71 
It is unethical to spam.  Not only is spamming based on fraud and deceit, it also shifts the 
costs attached to spamming to the consumer.  It also slows down the performance of the 
Internet.  Lastly, spamming is also considered to be very rude – i.e. it is not acceptable to 
send unsolicited e-mails to others. 
 
6.4.4 SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL POSITION ON SPAMMING 
Section 45 of the ECTA does not prohibit spamming72, but it places an obligation on a 
person that sends UCE to provide: 
(a) a consumer with an option to cancel her/his subscription to the mailing list73; 
(b) identifying particulars from the source from which the person’s particulars were 
obtained74. 
Failure to comply with the above may result, upon conviction, in a fine or 
imprisonment not exceeding 12 months75.  Any person who continues sending unsolicited 
e-mails, after having been advised that same is not welcome, is also guilty of an offence.  
Upon conviction the same penalties as aforestated may be imposed76.  In practice, this 
does not work, as an e-mail requesting the removal from an e-mail list is often used to 
confirm the recipient’s e-mail address to which spammers then continue sending 
unsolicited e-mails. 
UCE is not defined in the ECTA.  However, it is submitted that Gereda’s77 
interpretation is the correct one, i.e. spamming as a general nuisance is not prohibited by 
the ECTA, but only those e-mails that have as an end-goal some commercial gain.  It is 
submitted that this lack by the legislature in addressing spamming as a general problem 
                                                 
69
 Paragraphs 4 and 5 supra. 
70
 Compare the importance placed by the Constitutional Court on privacy in the cases discussed under paragraph 4.2 
above, to the lesser importance placed on the right to commercial expression by the High Court in Roundabout (op.cit). 
71
 http://www.biz-community.com/AntiSpamPolicy.aspx; http://www.cause.org/about/problem.shtml; 
72
 S Gereda. Sep. 2003 “The Truth about Spam” De Rebus 51 (hereinafter “Gereda”) criticises G Ebersöhn’s article in 
2003 (July) De Rebus 25 in which he stated that ‘section 45(3) provides that where A sends B an unsolicited message 
and fails to include an opt-out option in the message, he commits an offence.  Gereda is of the opinion that some sort of 
commercial gain is necessary before one can state that there was a breach of the provisions of the ECTA. 
73
 Section 45(1)(a). 
74
 Section 45(1)(b). 
75
 Section 45(3) read with section 89(1). 
76
 Section 45(4). 
77
 Cf note 23. 
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that needs to be curbed is regrettable, in that there is no penalty for spamming in its 
broader sense.  
Furthermore, it is indeed ironic78 that, despite its undesirability, a total prohibition on 
spam could violate the Constitutional right to freedom of expression79 This does not, 
however, mean that there is absolutely no way of addressing spamming as a problem at, 
for example, the work place.  As an employer one can prohibit spamming at the work 
place through policy, linked to the organisation’s disciplinary code80.  Internet users can 
also report spammers to their ISP, usually at the address abuse@....  The ISP will then 
investigate the complaint and remove the spammer from utilising its website. 
 
6.5 PERSONAL INFORMATION 
 
6.5.1 PRIVACY 
Section 14 of the Constitution guarantees the right to privacy.  However, the computer age 
does not always recognise the unsuspecting users’, and in particular that of 
unsophisticated internet users’, right to privacy. 
 
6.5.2 PERSONAL INFORMATION 
Part VIII of the ECTA deals with the right to privacy.  It provides for the voluntary 
compliance with the principles of the collection of personal information.  However, if an 
organisation opts to comply with the principles it must comply with all the provisions of 
section 51. 
Personal information is any information that is about an identifiable individual and it 
includes, amongst others81: 
 Information relating to the race, sex, gender, nationality, ethnicity, etc, of an individual; 
 Information relating to the educational qualifications; medical, criminal and employment 
history of an individual; 
 The views or opinions of an individual about another, subject to certain exclusions, etc. 
 
Section 51 of the ECTA lays down a set of principles within which data controllers82 ought 
to operate.  These include, inter alia: 
 Data may only be collected with the express written permission of a data subject83; 
 Data controllers may not collect information that is not useful for a lawful purpose; 
 The information may not be used for any reason other than the reason for which same 
is collected, unless the data subject gives her/his express written permission to doing 
so; 
 Information that has become obsolete must be destroyed, etc. 
                                                 
78
 As pointed out by Gereda (op.cit) at 52. 
79
 Cf the discussion of the Roundabout and Ad Outpost cases in paragraph 5.2 above. 
80
 As an employer, one must, however, be wary of the provisions of, in particular, section 6 of the Regulation of 
Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication Related Information Act No. 70 of 2002. 
81
 Section 1. 
82
 Defined in section 1 as “any person who electronically requests, collects, collates, processes or stores personal 
information from or in respect of a data subject”.  The latter, in turn, is defined as “any nature person from or in respect of 
whom personal information has been requested, collected, collated, processed or stored, after the commencement of the 
Act”. 
83
 Section 51(1) – emphasis added. 
  13 
A large percentage of reputable collectors of data inform a user of which information 
will be collected, which information will not be disclosed and which may be disclosed 
(obviously other than in accordance with an order of Court).  This is usually contained in 
the terms and conditions of use of the site where a user then can agree to accept or not.  
However, most people do not read the terms and conditions before they “agree” to all the 
terms and conditions of the site.  As stated above, the common law hold true and as such, 
unsuspecting Internet users fall “victim” to the maxim caveat subscriptor84.   
 
6.6 COOKIES 
Cookies are stored in a small text file on one’s hard drive when one visits certain web 
sites.  It usually contains information regarding the user’s preferences and when one 
revisits a site certain information need not be re-entered.  Cookies are automatically 
collected unless one disables the use of cookies on your browser.  Again, a lot of web site 
operators make users aware of the collection of cookies in their terms and conditions.  The 
ethical operators even go so far as to explain to unsophisticated users how to disable the 
creation of cookies.  However, this cannot be said in respect of unscrupulous web site 
operators! 
 
6.7 TRACKING DEVICES 
A large number of organisations use network software packages that contain features that 
allow administrators to monitor utilisation of the net by, for example, employees.  Again, 
one has to take cognisance of the provisions of section 6 of the Regulation of Interception 
of Communications and Provision of Communication Related Information Act 85, i.e. one 
must obtain the permission of the employee to monitor her/his data messages, failing 
which one is guilty of an offence86. 
 
7. CONCLUSION 
Although the ECTA has addressed some aspects and ensured legal certainty in certain 
regards, it does not address the right to privacy and consumer protection to the fullest 
extent possible.   
 
 
                                                 
84
 He who signs, be aware. 
85
 Act 70 of 2002. 
86
 Upon conviction one can be fined not exceeding R 2 000 000 or imprisoned for a period not exceeding 10 years. 
